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ABSTRACT

The Peace Process : A Case Study
by
Erika Lee Berlant
Dr. Andrew Tuttle, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis is a case study of the ongoing peace
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and the
lack of impact that past agreements have made on the recent
Oslo Accords.

The thesis will attempt to show that past

failures in 'land for peace' agreements between Israel and
Arab countries only illustrate what is in store for the Oslo
Accords.

In addition, the current Israeli administration's

failure to concede the disputed land in the occupied
territories is in part, due to the fear of an emerging
Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The

dangers of an independent Palestinian state will be
examined, both the strategic and geographic implications,
and some economic difficulties the Israelis will be faced
with.

Finally, the continuing impact of the PLO's role in

this arena will be examined.

iix
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
Land for Peace
The concept of "land for peace" was created by
Israel as a possible bargaining tool.

Israel would

grant autonomy or sovereignty to the Palestinians over
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and this sacrifice
would be in exchange for peace with its Arab neighbors.
It is a situation that is not easily solved and a
policy that could eventually do more harm than good.
It will always be hard to determine the outcome of
these exchanges, unless certain historical facts are
examined.

History has shown that Israel's concession

of land to Arabs has not had the effect that was hoped
for.

In fact, in some instances, the opposite of peace

has been the outcome.

There has been more violence and

aggression on the part of Arab nations.
There have been many attempts by the Israeli
government to give back land in exchange for peace.

The

Israelis have constantly given back land acquired from the
Arabs after being attacked by them.
Resolutions 242 and 338.

There were UN

These were the beginnings of the
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failing concept of "land for peace."

Soon after, there were

the famous Camp David Accords, which were supposed to
further the lingering peace process.

These particular

Accords were signed by both Israel and Egypt with the
persistence of then President Jimmy Carter.
have yet to show the results intended.

These accords

Finally, there is

the present Oslo Accords, signed by Yitzak Rabin
(Former Israeli Prime Minister) and PLO leader, Yasser
Arafat.

Yet, again, this proposes Israeli concession of

land for hopes of change.

There has always been the hope on

the behalf of the Israelis',

that terrorism will cease and

that concession will bring peace and non-aggression.

So

far, the pursuit of concessions has not been a fruitful
strategy.

The Israeli government's history of proposed

concessions should speak for itself.
The Arabs have not shown good faith and have not once
lived up to their end of the peace negotiations.

Terrorism

and aggression continued during each of these pacts, and
continue at this moment in time.

Historically,

this

strategy has been a failure and the Israelis must find a new
direction towards peace, if possible.
Furthermore,

it is too naive for the Israeli

government to think that Oslo will be different.

Time after

time, Israel has given back land that was conquered in war
waged on them by Arab countries.

It was usually at the

request of the United states or other nations that thought
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it unfair to occupy another country's land, even though the
acquisition was in self-defense.
Since the Jewish state was established,

Israel has

tried to make concessions to various Arab countries, to stop
violence and curb their feelings of anger regarding the
supposed displacement of their Palestinian Arab brethren.
These concessions to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and others, were
never enough and concluding from history, never will be.
The Arabs did not want some land, they wanted all of Israel
to be extinguished.

Trying to appease them by giving up a

little land, was and is not the answer.
The Security of Israel
What could the consequences be for Israel if a greater
portion of the land that surrounds it is given back to an
obviously hostile people?

There is much dissent in Israel

over the long term implications of relinquishing these
territories.

Yitzak Rabin believed that peace would have

been the outcome, when he decided to sign Oslo, but there
are those that doubt that peace will ever exist, because
underlying every issue that the Arabs have raised over
Israeli borders, the main issue is still the hatred of the
Jews and the hostility towards Israel's existence.
Furthermore, the West Bank and Gaza will most likely not be
enough in the future.

Arab nations such as; Syria, portions

of Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and other extremist Islamic groups,
still call for the destruction of Israel and some would
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claim that all of Palestine belongs to them, as the PLO (in
its Covenant and in its 1974 Cairo Declaration) does.

The

consequences of these feelings could wreak havoc on Israel.
Israel cannot really afford to deny these realities.
The geographical location of Israel is another
security problem.

Does the fact that Israel is surrounded

by hostile neighbors pose a threat to its security if it
were reduced to an indefensible size?

The Palestinians

might look at this new size as an opportunity to try to
seize the rest of the territory they see as theirs.

Syria

has always thought of Israel as a part of Greater Syria.
So, it becomes a possibility that Syria might try to take
advantage of a considerably smaller Israel.

On all fronts,

the Israelis are surrounded by people who have been their
sworn enemies for over 50 years, and if these territories
are relinquished,

Israel has two new fronts to fear.

This

geographical disadvantage should have been, and should still
be, a basis for reconsidering Oslo's suggestions.

The West

Bank and Gaza should never be totally relinquished.
Inter-Arab Conflict
Inter-Arab conflict has been a problem in the Middle
East for centuries, and could very easily be heightened by
granting total independence to Palestinian Arabs.

It is

what Arabs have been fighting for over 50 years, but a new
Palestinian state would have a direct effect on how they
conduct their foreign affairs.

When the Palestinians have
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been granted a home, the Arab coalition will have no
scapegoat to use as leverage for universal demands.
Arab nations fear for their own security.

For

instance, a Palestinian state on the West Bank could
threaten Jordan.

It is no secret that the Hashemite

regime's relationship with the PLO is on shaky grounds and
Jordan is seen by Palestinian militants as the other half of
Palestine.

There is a legitimate fear here.

The majority

of Jordan's population is Palestinian and a substantial
amount will want to join the East Bank with a Palestinian
Arab state on the West Bank.
The same idea stretches to cover the Arab nation of
Syria.

Syria will predictably not allow a Palestinian state

to exist for too long.

How long will Syria hesitate before

trying to take back what is supposedly its own?
It is worthy to mention that there are hostile
factions within the PLO that certainly will and do, fight
amongst themselves, and with others to control a new
Palestinian state and preserve it.

These facts contribute

to the doubts that "land for peace" can really bring about
its objectives.
Conclusion
The conclusion will try to show that the Israeli
attempt to buy peace will not be fruitful.

There might be

dangers facing Israel in the future, like its own security
and the inter-Arab conflicts that will be laid at its
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doorstep.

The possibility of harmony does look dismal under

the circumstances noted above.
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CHAPTER

2

THE HISTORY OF LAND FOR PEACE
Land for Peace
At the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the
Zionists in Israel would recognize different British
proposals for a peaceful settlements.

After the Arabs

rejected a proposal put before them by the Zionists in the
early 1930's to create separate, but equal political
recognition (which gave them equality without giving notice
to the fact of majority/minority status), the Zionists
continued to try to appease the Arabs.-

Samuel Katz writes

in his book Battleground :
...in 1937, the Zionist leaders agreed, again for
the sake of peace [italics mine], to share out the
Country, dividing what remained of the original
Mandated territory of Palestine after Eastern
Palestine had been given to the Arabs by the
British.
They accepted as a basis the partition
scheme proposed by the British Royal Commission.
The proposed Jewish miniature state would have been
highly indefensible. The Arab leaders rejected the
plan out of hand, and the British government buried
it .-

-Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in
Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York:
Steimatzky/Shapolsky, 1985)254-56 .
-Ibid.,256 .
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Katz writes again of a rejected Israeli concession:
A third effort at accommodation was made in 1947.
The Jewish underground having compelled the British
to relinquish their hold on Palestine, the Zionist
leaders once again announced their willingness to
accept a scheme of partition as a means of putting
an end to the conflict [italics mine]. The Zionist
leaders accepted the United Nations partition
proposal, which included a ludicrously vulnerable
Jewish state.
They persuaded themselves once more
that a heavy sacrifice would win the hearts of the
Arabs.^
These rejections by the Arabs were just the beginnings of a
long line of peace proposals that were either buried,
rejected, or accepted only later to be violated.

For

example, after the 1956 Suez War, the "Israelis withdrew
from the Sinai to the armistice Line in exchange for
Egyptian promises to keep the Suez Canal and the Straits of
Tiran open to Israeli shipping; to prevent guerilla
activities against Israel from its territory; and in due
course make peace...The Six Day War in 1967 was precipitated
by Egypt's use of force to close the Straits to Israeli
shipping."'

In addition, Egypt never halted terrorist

activities against Israel.

Quite the opposite took place;

Egypt still proposed the destruction of Israel and continued

^Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine
(Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York: Steimatzsky/Shapolsky,
1985)257.
■
’Eugene Rostow, "Resolution 242-A Historical" in Can
Israel Survive a Palestinian State?, e d . Michael Widlanski
(Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political
Studies),102.
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its anti-Semitic propaganda,
UN Resolution 242 and 338
In 1967 and 1973, the United Nations proposed two
separate resolutions, that were designed to work together,
to bring peace between the Israelis and the Arabs, "The 338
rule defines the vehicle through which peace should be
reached: negotiations between parties,- while the 242 rule
describes this future peace environment."'

On November 22,

1967, after the Six Day War between Israel and the Arabs,
Resolution 242 was originated.

War was being waged from

distances extremely close to the Israeli borders.

Israel

defended itself with great success and "gained control of
the remainder of Western Palestine clear to the Jordan
River, of the Golan Heights, and of the Sinai Peninsula down
to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea."’
' Resolution 242 stated
that the Israelis would discontinue occupation of some or
all of the territories in question-the West Bank, Gaza, and
the Golan Heights, as long as a true and durable peace
settlement could be agreed upon by both parties.'
Legally, according to this document,

Israel may

’Ze'ev Begin, A Zionist Stand (London: Frank Cass &
Co., 1993)133.
"Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in
Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York:
Steimatzky/Shapolsky, 1985)2.
"'Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York:
Bantam Books, 1993)289-90.
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continue to occupy those areas in question until there is a
cessation of aggression towards it, and recognition of its
right to exist in peace and security is concluded.

The

resolution was carefully written this way because of events
between Israel and Egypt in 1956, when Egypt violated its
agreement and used force to keep Israel out of the Straits
of Tiran. ^

It was clear that this clause was necessary

because, otherwise, the Arabs might concentrate solely on
the statement of withdrawal.

As it turned out, it did not

matter what other requirements may have been necessary for
Israeli withdrawal from the regions, the Arabs still
concentrated on mandatory Israeli withdrawal.
The objectives of Resolution 242 proved to be a source
of tension for over twenty years.

The Arabs consistently

refused to make peace with the Israelis ostensibly because
they would not withdraw from the territories in question
(but in reality because they refused to accept Israel), and
the Israelis refused to withdraw because the Arabs would not
sign any agreements of peace.

And, the Israelis had the

right to remain exactly where they were and the Arabs chose
to ignore the very clear instructions set forth in
Resolution 242.

Eugene Rostow cites part of the Resolution

in his essay Resolution 242-A Historical Perspective:

^Eugene Rostow, "Resolution 242-A Historical Perspective"
in Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State? Ed. Michael
Widlanski (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and
Political Studies, 1990)102.
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The Resolution specifies that "the fulfillment of
Charter principles requires the establishment of a
just and lasting peace in the Middle East which
would include the application of the following
Principles: (i) withdrawal of armed forces from
territories of recent conflict; and (ii) . . .respect
for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and political independence
of every state in the area and their right to live
in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.
The Resolution did not require the Israelis to withdraw from
all territories, period.

Furthermore,

it did not require

that the Israelis withdraw at all until peace and
recognition of sovereignty were agreed upon by all parties.
Rostow further notes,

"It is not possible to say that the

Resolution is ambiguous on this point or that it requires
Israel to accept the 1967 boundaries.
Resolution 338, which was written six years later on
October 22, 1973, originated at a time when Resolution 242
still had not been recognized.

Resolution 338 orders that

"negotiations start between the parties concerned under the
appropriate auspices, aimed at establishing a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East."-

These Resolutions

never resulted in their original intent, which was to bring
peace and stability to the region.
Israel has, over the years, shown good faith.

They

^Michael Widlanski, Can Israel Survive a Palestinian
State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and
Political Studies, 1990)103.
10

Ibid.,103.

— Ze'ev Begin,
(1991)25 .

"The Likud Vision," Foreign Affairs Fall
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have consistently agreed to relinquish territory, as long as
Arab terrorism ceased and an agreement on their sovereignty
could be reached.

Since these Resolutions were written,

Israel has offered to make further concessions.

These

consist of 1) the return of the Sinai Peninsula to the
Egyptians, and 2) the return of portions of the Golan
Heights to Syria.

The return of the Peninsula was a

dangerous move, considering it was vital to Israeli security
and the Golan Heights sits above the Northern half of
Israel.

Still, Israel offered these concessions.—

Even

with Israeli cooperation, the Arab nations have not felt
compelled to do the same.

It is the Arab contention that

Israel must relinquish all territory, period.

Benjamin

Netanyahu wrote :
It took twelve years for Egypt to comply with
Security Council Resolution.
In explicitly refusing
to make peace with Israel, the other twenty Arab
states flout the dictates of Resolution 242 to this
day.
Yet, with unsurpassed hypocrisy, they reverse
casualty yet again and claim that it is Israel that
is in violation of the Resolution with which they
themselves have yet to make the slightest gesture
of compliance.
Netanyahu goes on to observe that the Arabs have completely
misused the wording of the Resolution to fit their argument;
Their accusations are based on an additional clause
in Resolution 242, which calls for "withdrawal of
Israeli armed forces from areas occupied in the
recent conflict." Israel, claim the Arabs, have
“Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York:
Bantam Books, 1993)290-91.
13Ibid.,290-91.
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never obeyed the directive to withdraw from "the
territories." Why should they make peace, when
Israel is still in possession of the West Bank, the
Golan, and Gaza? They conveniently chose to forget
that any Israeli withdrawal was supposed to follow
the signing of peace agreements, which the Arab
states adamantly refuse to sign.-’
The Arabs have never changed their hostile sentiments
towards the Israelis.

This continual hostility should have

made the process of giving back land for peace look futile.
However, and for whatever reasons, Israel tried this again
in the 1970's with the Camp David Accords.

As expected,

che

results were quite the same.
The Camp David Accords
The first peace treaty ever signed with an Arab
country came into existence twelve years after the UN
Resolutions.

After twelve years, an Arab country decided to

make some concessions after Israel had made so many in those
intermittent years.

The treaty, a direct result of the

negotiations at Camp David, was influenced by another war
that had been waged upon Israel: the Yom Kippur War.

During

the Yom Kippur War, Israel was able to regain its occupation
of the Golan Heights, taken from Syria in the 1967 attack
(it took Israel approximately ten days to recapture the
Golan from Syria, who conquered the Heights in the Yom
Kippur attack).

In addition, Israel took control of some of

"Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations
Bantam Books, 1993)291.

(New York:
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Egypt's land inside its borders."
Jimmy Carter, the U.S. President at the time, proposed
the negotiations between Menahim Begin, of Israel, and Anwar
Sadat, of Egypt.

This was the beginning of the Camp David

Accords, taking the name from the location of the
negotiations in Camp David, Maryland.

The framework of the

Accords were as such:
The two nations were to conclude a peace treaty
within three months.
Israel would withdraw from
the entire Sinai Peninsula and turn it back to
Egypt. The area would be demilitarized. The
Israeli pullout would occur in phases...the first
one taking place within three to nine months after
the signing of the peace treaty. Normal diplomatic
relations would then be established.
The final
withdrawal would be carried out within two to three
years after the pact was signed."
The pact had two parts :
The first part included Israel's promise to withdraw
from all of the Sinai in return for peace and
normalization of relations. Although Egypt was to
exercise its sovereignty over the relinquished
areas, it agreed to certain security arrangements.
The second part contained self-rule, or autonomy,
plan for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria,
and Gaza."
The West Bank and Gaza were given special attention.
It was agreed that "Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and elected
Palestinian representatives would negotiate the key
'■^Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasv in
Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York:
Steimatzky/Shapolsky, 1985)223.
"Lester A. Sobel, Peace-Making in the Middle East (New
York: Facts-on-File, Inc., 1980)223.
"Yael Yishai, Land or Peace: Whither Israel?
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987)21.
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questions of sovereignty of the Israeli-occupied territory
after a five year transition period.

Israel would conclude

a peace treaty at the end of that time.""
There were additional provision added, such as keeping
Israeli troops in the Israeli-occupied territories until the
five year period was over; the eventual autonomy of the
Palestinians, although "there was a tacit acknowledgment of
Israel's special position in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, which
granted it a veto on issues such as the setting up of a
Palestinian state, a strong role in internal security, and a
substantial say in the determination of the specific powers
and responsibilities of the self-governing a u t h o r i t y " ; and
sharing police duties with Jordan and Egypt.-'
The utopian vision behind the drafting of these
Accords was that other Arab nations would be an eventual
party to the treaty.

However, other Arab nations wanted

nothing to do with the treaty or the signing of it.

Most of

Egypt's Arab neighbors branded Sadat a traitor and an
opposition coalition began.

King Hussein of Jordan refused

to be a party to the Accords because "Amman was not a party
to the pacts" and PLO leader Yasser Arafat accused Sadat of

"Lester A. Sobel, Peace-Making in the Middle East
York: Facts-on-File, Inc., 1980)223.

(New

"Yael Yishai, Land or Peace: Whither Israel (Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1987)21.
^Lester A. Sobel, Peace-Making in the Middle East
York: Facts-on-File, Inc.)223-24.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

(New

16

making agreements that did not accurately represent the
people."*

The Arabs made attempts to block peace by cutting

all ties with Egypt and boycotting Egyptian business.

In

addition, there were massive terrorist attacks upon Israel
and Egypt.

Again, Israel was agreeing to give up land for

peace and the Arabs balked at the gesture.
As years passed, it seemed as if Egypt had a difficult
time upholding its end of the agreement.

Martin Sicker,

author of Israel's Quest for Security, wrote that "The
provisions in the treaty that call for normalization of
relations were never really taken seriously in Egypt, and
the peace accord soon dwindled to nothing more than a treaty
of nonbelligerence."'*

Egypt's idea of peace was probably

one of a simple cessation of tensions, and not a long term
commitment.

In an article entitled "The Illusion of Land

for Peace", it has been written that "The Camp David Accords
(Article 3, Clause 5) call for Egypt and Israel to 'refrain
from hostile propaganda

[directed at one another]...'

Egypt's government controlled press repeatedly violated this
obligation...""'

After Israel had already given up vital

-'-Lester A. Sobel, Peace-Makincr in the Middle East
York: Facts-on-File, Inc) 226.

(New

Ibid.,262-64 .
^''Martin Sicker, Israel's Guest for Security (New York :
Praeger Publishing, 1989)161.
-•*Joel Weingarten, "The Illusion of Land for Peace, " The
National Interest Summer (1989)114.
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territory on the Peninsula, Egypt had the opportunity to
abrogate the agreement :
On April 21 and May 3, 1987, ...El Abram. . .affirmed
that Israel exports irradiated foodstuffs to Egypt,
saying that this was an Israeli conspiracy aimed at
spreading death.
In December 1988, the government:
owned newspaper El Akkhar claimed that Israel was
the most likely culprit in the terrorist bombing
of Pan Am flight 103 which exploded over Lockerbie,
Scotland on December 21, killing 259 passengers..."
On these dates noted above, Egypt was under different
leadership

than the time of the treaty signing.

However,

the treaty was still binding, although not according to
Egypt.

Leadership was irrelevant, however, because neither

Sadat, nor the newer Mubarak, considered the treaty legally
binding until Israel rescinded Gaza and the West Bank.-"
This was not a requirement of Israel until certain
conditions were met and those conditions were not met.

This

is another example of Arab leaders negating their
responsibilities.
Diplomatic relations were supposed to be in effect as
a condition of the treaty.

Israel would withdraw from the

Sinai and Egypt would cease negative propaganda and violence
^^Joel Weingarten "The Illusion of Land for Peace," The
National Interest Summer(1989), 115.
^®Ibid.,114. Weingarten writes that "As Egyptian
President Sadat made clear , and as his successor Mr.
Mubarak has affirmed, Egypt sees maintenance of the treaty
predicated upon Israel's forfeiture of Judea and Samaria to
the Arab Palestinians. Therefore, Egypt sees no obligation
to uphold the treaty if Israel does not give back additional
territories to third parties. However, Mr. Mubarak has not
said that Egypt would be willing to return the Sinai to
Israel if Egypt declares the treaty null and void."
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and enter diplomacy.

Of course, this idea of diplomacy

dwindled away:
At the height of the Lebanese War in 1982, Eg^-pt's
President Mubarak withdrew his ambassador to Israel.
He then laid down terms for a resumption of
diplomatic ties which called for Israel to withdraw
from Lebanon in a manner 'not contingent' upon
a Syrian withdrawal. Ultimately, Egypt did not
agree to return its ambassador to Israel until the
end of 1986.
It should further be noted that since
1981 Egypt has only agreed to one summit meeting
between the Egyptian and Israeli leaders-and that
was at the behest of the United States.-"
Egypt decided to react and abide by the treaty on its own
terms, as if the original treaty did not exist.
of the agreement have been violated.

Other terms

For instance, a

normalization of trade and tourism was to develop but this
never materialized,

"...Egypt has placed an almost total

embargo on trade with Israel, and tourism has evolved into a
one way street.

Though Israelis are eager to spend their

leisure dollars in Cairo, Egypt discourages its citizens
from traveling to Israel."^®
The most important violation of the Accords has been
Egypt's resistance to the deterrence of terrorist activities
directed against Israeli citizens.

In fact, "Egypt has

aided the PLO by providing its terrorist with safe havens in
Cairo and allowing them to launch attacks against Israel

^^Joel Weingarten,"The Illusion of Land for Peace," The
National Interest Summer (1989)115.
:»Ibid.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

19

from its borders."^'

The Accords proved to be a failure in

the ongoing strategy of "land for peace."
and Arab nations demanded more.

Israel conceded

Egypt literally made the

treaty defunct.
So, what was different in Oslo?

The Oslo Accords have

been signed, but the Accords have not been any more
effective than others of the past; with the primary emphasis
being on Israel withdrawal from the occupied territories,
and not on a cessation of terrorism and violence.
The Oslo Accords
The newest venture in the land for peace agreements is
the Oslo Accords, originally drafted and embarked upon by
U.S. President Bill Clinton and the former Israeli Prime
Minister Rabin.

The draft is familiar,

up more than it will receive.

in that Israel gives

In this last proposal, Israel

comes dangerously close to authorizing a separate
Palestinian state, which has been an avoided issue for years
by all Israeli governments.

Israel granted autonomy to the

West Bank and the Gaza Strip in return for peace, leaving
itself completely vulnerable.

Oslo has proved to be as

ineffective as the others in convincing the Arabs to
peacefully coexist.
^®Joel Weingarten, "The Illusion of Land for Peace," The
National Interest Summer (1989)115. He cites examples of
terrorist attacks against Israel. One example was in March
1988, when six Israeli civilians were killed on a bus that
was attacked by terrorists.
The terrorists might have been
helped through the Israeli border by the Egyptians.
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In 1991, the first phase of these negotiations took
place at a conference in Madrid, which was overseen by the
United States and the Soviet Union.

In the article "Arabs

and Israelis : Slow Walk Towards Peace", it is written that
"the framework for negotiations called for bilateral
discussions between Israel and Syria,

Israel and Lebanon,

and Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
Eight sets of bilateral sessions had taken place by the end
of 1 9 9 2 . " ' °
There were further issues that were discussed during
these initial negotiations such as; arms control, regional
security, economic development, refugees, the environment,
and water resources.'*

The issues here were discussed along

multilateral lines, with every negotiating party involved.
The process was difficult because every side had
reservations about the process.

For instance, the Israelis

did not want to negotiate with any member of the PLO and the
Syrians were hesitant about attending as well.'*
Nevertheless,

Israel eventually met with not only

Syria, but with Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO.
Rabin's Labor Party was more flexible than earlier leaders
like Shamir and his Likud Party, or the present Prime
'°M. Graeme Bannerman, "Arabs and Israelis: Slow Walk
Towards Peace," Foreign Affairs vol.72, no.l (1992-93)152.
^•'I b i d .

-^Ibid. The Syrians did not want multilateral talks until
satisfactory bilateral talks were held.
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Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Rabin started negotiating

concessions on land that the Likud party would have never
compromised on for the sake of security and peace, for
instance, the possibility of relinquishing Jerusalem was
contemplated.

Bannerman asserts:

The... Israeli government appears to support the
view that UN Security Council Resolution 242 does
indeed apply to all fronts, including the Golan
Heights. Rabin has worked to lead Israeli public
opinion to perceive the benefits of peace as well
as the need for additional concessions."
Rabin put forth the idea that the Israelis were willing in
the future to make even more sacrifices.

At this point, the

Israelis and the Palestinians had different principles laid
out about interim self-government and the future of the
Palestine becoming its own state.

The Israelis opposed any

interim government authority and the Palestinians thought it
necessary.

Israel was worried about its security and the

Palestinians were worried about their pride.^

However, it

was expected that Rabin's party would become more flexible
about interim self-governing and this was a correct
assumption.
During the years from the Madrid Conference until the
signing of the Declaration of Principles on September 13,
1993, between Israel and the PLO, many relevant events and

-^M. Graeme Bannerman, "Arabs and Israelis: Slow Walk
Towards Peace," Foreign Affairs vol.72, no.l (1992-93)154.
^Adam Garfinkle, "Documentation: Israeli and Palestinian
Proposals for the West Bank," Orbis Summer (1992)432.
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advances took place.

In the CRS Issue Brief, they were

summed up as follows:
Bilateral talks followed in Washington between
December 1991 and September 1993, with Israel,
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians,
emphasizing different sides of the "territory for
peace" exchange enshrined in UN Resolution 242.
Israel and the Palestinians discussed a 5-year
period of interim self-rule leading to a final
settlement.
In addition to this progress, there were other
discussions on land concessions.

For example,

"Israel and

Syria discussed Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights in
exchange for peace, with neither conceding priority to the
other.

Israel and Jordan agreed on the agenda, but delayed

ratification pending Israeli-Palestinian progress...""
The initial Declaration of Principles suggested chat
the Israeli government was caving in to Palestinian demands
of self-rule.

There were two agreements concluded, one of

which was the "Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition."'"

This

agreement concluded that :
...PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat recognized Israel's
right to exist, accepted UN Security Council
Resolution 242 and 338, the Middle East peace
process, and the peaceful resolutions of conflict.
He renounced terrorism and violence and undertook
to prevent them. Stating that the articles of the
Palestinian Covenant that contradict these commit
ments are invalid, he undertook to submit Covenant
changes to the Palestinian National Council and
^^Carol Migdalovitz, "The Middle East Peace Process," CRS
Issue Brief. September 2, 1994 ed.l.
^ Ibid.CRS-1
^Ibid.CRS-1
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and called upon the people of the West Bank and Gaza
to reject violence.
Prime Minister Rabin [at this
time] recognized the PLO as the representative of
the Palestinian people and agreed to negotiate with
it.
The Declaration of Principles entailed agreements made about
Palestinian interim self-government for the West Bank and
Gaza.

These were the Oslo agreements that were held

secretly between Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and
PLO official Mahmoud Abbas.

These principle included:

Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho... to be
implemented by Israeli withdrawal within four months
thereafter..."Early Empowerment" or transfer of
authority over education, culture, health, social
welfare, direct taxation, and tourism in the West
Bank and Gaza to Palestinians...Elections in 9
months of a Palestinian to sit in Bethlehem with
jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza.
Palestinians who reside in East Jerusalem will vote.
Israeli troops will redeploy from Palestinian
population centers before the election and redeploy
further as a Palestinian police force assumes re
sponsibility for public order."
There were further agreements :
Joint Israeli-Palestinian committees will deal with
common issues such as economic cooperation and
dispute resolution.
The parties will invite Jordan
and Egypt to establish cooperation arrangements
that will decide modalities of admission of persons
displaced in 1967,...During the interim period,
Israel will be responsible for external security,
settlements, Israelis, and foreign relations.
Permanent status negotiations will begin in the
third year of interim rule (April 13, 1996) and may
include Jerusalem.

^Carol Migdalovitz, "The Middle East Peace Process," CRS
Issue Brief. September 2, 1994 ed.l3.
" lbid.CRS-14.
"°Ibid.
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Along with these agreements,

Israel managed to make

agreements with such other Arab nations as Jordan, in which
Israel agreed to withdraw from "two small strips of land,
one near the Dead Sea, and one near Lake Tiberias, that it
seized in 1968."^*

The two countries signed a treaty in

October 1994 to "terminate the state of belligerency" and
conduct bilateral negotiations on issues like economics and
combating crime.’Oslo II, signed in September of 1995, called for
further negotiations in expanding Palestinian autonomy in
the West Bank.

This has been labeled the "point of no

return" for Israel.’- Oslo II has been seen as giving
Palestinians the chance to acquire an independent Palestine
state, a reality that would be disastrous for Israel.
The Flaws in Oslo
Aside from the eventual security implications of an
independent Palestinian state, there are fundamental flaws
in the agreement between Israel and the PLO.

The PLO has

already violated the agreement, as has Israel, in
retaliation.

■’^Carol Migdalovitz "The Middle East Peace Process," CRS
Issue Brief, September 2, 1994 ed.l, 15/16.
•’^Ibid.
’^Dore Gold, "Caroming Down the Road to Peace," Jerusalem
Post International October 7, 1995.
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This is in part due to the idea that Israelis and
Palestinians were not seeking the same results.

The two

parties had totally different agendas when devising and
signing the OOP.

Amos Perlmutter notes that the Israelis

built the process among Israeli "needs and demands," not
wanting to address the issue of Palestinian statehood until
a later date.

While Arafat was a "sooner than later" kind

of diplomat that wanted every inch of territory that was
seen as belonging to the Palestinians and sought eventual
statehood for the West Bank and Gaza "including East
Jerusalem," which the Israelis have been steadfastedly
refusing to compromise.’’
The Israelis apparently did not consider the idea that
Arafat might not be sincere in his quest for peace.
did not hide his aspirations in the least.

Arafat

David Bar-Ilian

has documented that fact :
Addressing "the Palestinian people" on Jordanian
television on the very day of the signing, September
13, 1993, Arafat never mentioned peace with Israel
or the cessation of terrorism.
But he did say that
the Declaration of Principles was the first step
in the PLO "plan of phases" of 1974.’'
These phases Bar-Ilian is quoting are the phases in which
Israel will eventually become conquered and destroyed.
Palestine becoming a sovereign state in the West Bank and

■‘■‘Amos Perlmutter, "The Israeli-PLO Accord is dead, "
Foreign Affairs May/June (1995)63.
^David Bar-Illan,
February (1995)31.

"If This Be Peace...," Commentary
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Gaza is just one step closer to this eventuality.

This

probability could lead to the demise of Israel because of
security risks, such as physical, geographic, and economic
dangers.
There were numerous suppositions in the tenets of
Oslo, one of which was the idea that Arafat was a diplomat,
willing to stop terrorist attacks from the West Bank and
Gaza, and by the PLO, against Israelis.

Aside from this,

negotiating with Arafat does not necessarily produce
results.

The reality is that Arafat has not done this,

except to curtail them recently, not as an end, but as a
means to facilitate IDF withdrawal.

Also, some believe that

Arafat is not the sole voice within the PLO as seen by many
Palestinians.

Arafat has lost his credibility and

popularity over the years, and "just about everybody is
opposed to him in one way or another...a generation of
Palestinian nationalists and Muslim fundamentalists has
emerged in the occupied territories to violently oppose
Oslo, demanding the destruction of Israel proper and an end
to land-for-peace d i p l o m a c y . T h e former Rabin government
apparently ignored Israeli intelligence estimates that
Arafat no longer held the power he once did over this new
generation of militants and that he was hated by many PLO

‘^Amos Perlmutter, "The Israel-PLO Accord is Dead,"
Foreign Affairs May/June (1995)61.
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v e t e r a n s . Dore Gold describes Arafat as being
"immeasurably weaker than any other head of state.
Therefore, it was imprudent co think that Arafat could, or
would, for that matter, have halted terrorist activities
being carried out by Hamas or Jihad, two notorious terrorist
organizations.

In fact, in an earlier article, written in

1995, before these terrorist groups started to feel a bit
more unity, it was written that,

"Hamas leaders use Arafat's

agreement with Israel as a pretext to brand him a
traitor.However,

these opposing Muslims would come to

know that Arafat's land-for- peace agreement was just a
phase in a strategy of phases to wipe out Israel.

They will

eventually stand with him again.
There have been quite a few terrorise attacks on
Israel since Oslo's signing.

In fact, the degree of attacks

would make one think that Arafat had done absolutely nothing
to curb these activities.

Many attacks occurred very

shortly after the signing, and were rumored to have been
done by Arafat's own sect of the PLO, "in the months after
the DOP was signed, there was intensified violence by Arabs
against Jews, some of it perpetuated by Arafat's own Fatah

‘^Amos Perlmutter, "The Israel-PLO Accord is Dead,"
Foreign Affairs May/June (19 95)63.
■•^Dore Gold, "Where is the Peace Process Going?,"
Commentary August (1995)40.
■
‘^David Bar-Illan,
February (1995)31.

"If This Be Peace...," Commentary

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

28

faction."'°

And, in the few months prior to Oslo II, "in

gross violation of his commitment under the agreement,
Arafat's wing of the PLO, Fatah, carried out at least twelve
terrorist a t t a c k s A r a f a t

had no real desire to

prevent this violence and still does not.
In the first few years surrounding the agreement,
Arafat failed to abide by his commitments:
Arafat...has failed to keep several commitments he
made in Oslo: to discipline PLO members who engage
in terrorism; to pursue, apprehend, and extradite
terrorists to Israel; to refrain from hiring
fugitive terrorists as policemen; and to condemn
terrorist attacks explicitly.
In addition to all
that, Farouk Kaddoumi (who, in another violation of
the agreement, has appeared at the UN as the
"Foreign Minister of Palestine") consistently and
openly calls for the continuation of the "armed
struggle.
And in the intermittent years between 1995 and the present,
there has been no end to the accounts of terrorist
activities in Israel.
In 1996 the new Likud party took office in Israel,
with Benjamin Netanyahu as the Prime Minister.

No one

doubts his opposition to Oslo; however, with the

^Douglas Feith,
(1994)33 .

"Land for no Peace," Commentary June

“David Bar-Illan, "If This Be Peace...," Commentary
(1995): 30. He gives an example of an attack on an Israeli
policeman by known members of Fatah. It was reported in the
Palestinian newspaper as being committed by members of
Hamas. In addition, the reporters were threatened if they
revealed any true identities.
“ Ibid.
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assassination of Rabin in 1995, Netanyahu had no choice but
to continue the process, with care.

There are, however,

issues attached to Oslo that Mr. Netanyahu will not bend on.
The Netanyahu government decided in 1996, for reasons
of tourism, to open an exit from a "Hasmonean-era tunnel in
the vicinity of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem."''

The

Palestinians, Arafat, in particular, denounced this as a
violation of their religion, being so close to their holy
mosque, and retaliated by throwing stones and Molotov
cocktails and firing upon Israeli soldiers with the very
automatic weapons that Israel itself gave the Palestinian
Authority when they were finally granted autonomy.

In the

end, seventy three people died and fifteen hundred people
were injured.“

As it turned out, the tunnel's new exit was

nowhere near the holy mosque, it was just another excuse for
violence.
In February of 1996:
...suicide bombers had blown themselves up in two
Jerusalem buses, at a soldiers' pick up station
in Ashkelon, and on a crosswalk in a Tel Aviv
shopping center; an Islamic fanatic had plowed his
car into a crowd waiting at a bus stop in
Jerusalem; and five youths loaded with explosives
had been apprehended while trying to penetrate an
Israeli settlement in the Gaza district. Except
for the Gaza attack, eveiry one of these operations
resulted in deaths-62 all told. This brought the
total terror fatalities in the 31 months since the
“Douglas Feith, "A Strategy for Israel," Commentary
September (1997)25.
“Norman Podhoretz, "The Tragic Predicament of Benjamin
Netanyahu," Commentary December (1996)34.
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signing of the Oslo agreements to 213, the largest
number in any such period since the establishment
of the state.
It has been speculated that terrorism is not only increasing
since Oslo, but it is more efficient in its taking of lives.
The PLO and the PA are more advanced in their weaponry and
more organized, because of their new mini-state."
Furthermore, the new PA has been consistent in its own
violations of Oslo.

The PA has failed to "confiscate the

illegal arms in the hands of terrorist groups like Hamas and
Islamic Jihad; the recruitment of terrorists into the PA
security forces,- the refusal to hand over terrorism suspects
to Israel for prosecution; the rapid release of terrorists
from PA prisons; the conduct of official PA operations in
Jerusalem; the use of incendiary anti-Israeli rhetoric by
Arafat and other PA officials, including calls for jihad and
praise of suicide bombers as "martyrs and heroes"; and the
PA'S failure to amend the Palestinian Covenant, which calls
for the eventual destruction of Israel.'"

The Palestinian

Covenant was supposed to be amended at the signing of Oslo
and has yet to be changed.

The Palestinian National Council

had announced that it had been amended, but not a single

^^David Bar-Illan,
(

"The Wages of Oslo," Commentary May

1996 ) 2 3 .

“ Ibid.,23-24.
“ Douglas Feith, "A Strategy for Israel," Commentary
September (1997): 25.
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word is different; it still calls for the destruction of
Israel.“
The Future
With all these violations, terrorism and anti-Israeli
rhetoric, how can Israel prevail?
that it will not.

The answer seems to be

The Palestinians have proved recently

what other Arab nations have proven in the in the past.
There is no prospect of real peace.

Israel has just given

the Palestinians their own state, essentially, , and the
violence continues.

What can Israel do now?

There is no

turning back.
One option for Israel now is to take back the West
Bank and Gaza from the Palestinians,
Oslo.“

in direct violation of

The world seems disgusted at Benjamin Netanyahu's

hard line policy, but has not addressed the problems of the
many Israelis and Arabs that are dying as a result of PLO,
PA, and other Islamic militant groups that violate the
Accords every day.

The option of Palestinian statehood is

forgotten at this point because security dangers are too
risky.

If the Palestinians are granted their own state, the

Israelis will not be able to take it back once accepted.
will be sovereign and the violence will only increase on
Israel's small borders.
“Norman Podhoretz, "The Tragic Predicament of
Netanyahu," Commentary December (1997)32.
59

Ibid.,40.
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Another option may be to continue stalling, and "pay
lip service" to Oslo supporters, without granting anything
further.

Israel will continue to try and avert terrorism

and continue to watch its partners in the treaty abrogate
the demands put on them by its signing.
is not a winning strategy.

However,

"stalling

The appearance of stalling

damages the government's credibility at home and abroad.

If

it claims to be committed to Oslo but fails for weeks and
months to move the process along, Israel looks
disingenuous.So,

unfortunately,

Israel is caught in a

bind, of which there is no way out now, and which
furthermore, could have been avoided in 1991, 1993 and 1995.
A fact that cannot now be ignored is the prospect of
Palestinian statehood.

The dangers that might emerge from

this prospect for Israel are endless.

“Douglas Feith, "A Strategy for Israel," Commentary
September (1996)28.
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3

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF A PALESTINIAN STATE
Surrounded by Hostility
In relinquishing these territories and granting
autonomy to the Palestinians, Israel has helped to pave the
way for an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank.
It is no secret that this is the aspiration of Yasser
Arafat.

He has been quoted in the Jerusalem Post on

September 3, 1993, as saying "The Palestinian state is
within our grasp.

Soon the Palestinian flag will fly on the

walls, the minarets and the cathedrals of Jerusalem."'*
Arafat has been quoted in the Jerusalem Post on September
19, 1993, as claiming "Our first goal is the liberation of
all occupied territories and return of all refugees, selfdetermination for the Palestinians and the establishment of

“Americans for a Safe Israel, "Quotes You Can Use,"
Organizing for Israel: A Guide to Zionist Activities.
33
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a Palestinian state whose capitol is Jerusalem.

An

establishment of a Palestinian state will be detrimental
to Israel.
Historically, Israeli concession of land for peace
never helped to counter any feelings of anti-Semitism.

It

will be unlikely that a new concession of land will change
those feelings.

Years of occupation and defeat have

aggravated these anti-Semitic feelings.

It is a bizarre

mistake to compare the Israeli occupation and treatment of
the Palestinians in those occupied areas, to the treatment
of the Jews by the Nazis.

David Bar-Illan writes that

"Portraying Israel as a latter-day Nazi-Germany is, of
course, a favorite Arab propaganda line.'"'

This portrayal

of Israel as a modern Nazi-machine, helps Arab propagandists
create a tarnished and evil Israeli image, one inviting
hatred and invoking violence.
This hostility will prove to be a vital security
threat to Israel.
overnight.

Peace is not something that will happen

The long time refusal most Arab states to

“Americans for a Safe Israel, "Quotes You Can Use,"
Organizing for Israel: A Guide to Zionist Activities. There
are also quotes by Nabil Sha'ath, the senior aide to Arafat,
as saying,"Gaza-Jericho first means total exercise of
Palestinian sovereignty over the two regions as a first step
toward an independent Palestinian state." This was in the
Jerusalem Post on Sept. 10, 1993. Another quote is by Sari
Nusseibeh, a PLO negotiations leader that states "its no
secret that we are working towards Palestinian state in
less than five years. Jerusalem Post Sept. 22, 1993.
“ David Bar-Illan, "Israel: Guilt and Politics,"
Commentary May (1994)25.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

35

recognize Israel cannot be believed to change with the
signature of an agreement.

One fact is, that the only way

true peace can become a reality is if the Arabs truly
recognize Israel as a sovereign entity.

This attempt has

been made before with the Camp David Accords.

Egypt failed,

in practice, to recognize Israel as legitimate.

Douglas

Feith wrote that peace "has to do with attitudes of mindwith a mutual belief that each state has sovereign rights
and a shared conviction that no party should take what
belongs to a n o t h e r . S i n c e it is clear that the Arabs
believe that Israel has robbed land in the past, it is
highly probable that they have not changed their minds.
The hostile attitude, the terrorist activity, and the
outward aggression aimed at Israel does not seem to be
suspended.

Israel is the enemy, past and present.

Syria's

long time hatred of the Israelis and Egypt's call to "throw
the Jews into the sea" is not a sentiment that it is easily
changed by relinquishing territory.

Israel will always be

in danger in the midst of this hostility.

A treaty will not

change this and the Palestinian Covenant proves this.
The Palestinian Covenant
There has been a continual call for the destruction of
Israel.

The most vocal organization is the Palestinian

Liberation Organization.

A vital part of the Oslo Accords

“ Douglas Feith, "A Mandate for Israel," The National
Interest Spring (1993)
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was the promise of Yasser Arafat to change the Palestinian
Covenant, which calls for the destruction of Israel.
Arafat and the followers of his ideology believe the
land that Israel occupies to be Arab homeland.

This is not

just the West Bank and Gaza, but all land integral to
Palestine before the British Mandate in the 1920's.

In the

Palestinian Covenant, it states in Article 2 that
"Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British
Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.'"'The entire Covenant repeatedly calls for the
liberation of Palestine and the return of this land to its
rightful owners-the Palestinian people.

The Covenant

declares the Balfour Declaration and the Partition Plans of
1947 completely illegal (this Declaration and partition
designs gave Israel its tiny beginning).

Some excerpts from

the Covenant are as follows :
Article 3 : The Palestinian people possess the legal
right to their homeland and have the right to
determine their destiny...
Article 19 : The partition of Palestine in 1947 and
the establishment of the State of Israel are
entirely illegal regardless of the passage of time,
because they were contrary to the will of the
Palestinian people and to their natural right in
their homeland...
Article 20 : The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate
for Palestine and everything that has been based

“ Jillian Becker, The PLO-The Rise and Fall of
Palestinian Liberation Organization (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1984)231.
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upon them, are deemed null and void...“
The Covenant also insists on liberating the land through an
armed struggle and that this struggle will not cease until
the Palestinians have their victory.

Articles 9, 10, and 30

illustrate this point:
Article 9 : Armed struggle is the only way to
liberate Palestine.
Thus it is the overall
strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The
Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute
determination and firm resolution to continue
their armed struggle and to work for an armed
popular revolution for the liberation of their
country and their return to it...
Article 10: Commando action constitutes the nucleus
of the Palestinian popular liberation war.
This
requires its escalation, comprehensiveness and
mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and
educational efforts and their organization and
involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution...
Article 30 : Fighters and carriers of arms in the
war of liberation are the nucleus of the popular
army which will be the protective force for the
gains of the Palestinian Arab people.'"
Finally, the Covenant describes Zionism as an entity that is
to be regarded as racist and aggressive and should be
destroyed :
Article 22: Zionism is a political movement
organically associated with international
imperialism and antagonistic to all action for
liberation and to progressive movements in the
world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature,
aggressive, expansionist, and colonial in its aims.
“ Jillian Becker. The PLO-The Rise and Fall of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1984),233. The article goes on to say that the
Jews insistence that Palestine is their homeland in
inconsistent with history and that Judaism is a religion not
a nationality, so Israel cannot be a state based on
religion.
“ Ibid.,231-234 .
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and fascist in its methods.
Israel is the
instrument of the Zionist movement, and a
geographical base for world imperialism placed
strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to
combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation,
unity, and progress. Israel is a constant source of
threat vis-a'-vis peace in the Middle East and the
whole world. .
The articles of the Covenant makes the PLO's intentions
clear.

By Arafat's own reluctance to change these

provisions, his announcement that peace is the intention is
not authentic.

The Covenant has not yet been modified and

this poses a threat to Israel.

The prospect for its

destruction by aggressive means is not preposterous.
The original Israeli hope was that an autonomous
Palestinian entity will be satisfied with it's new identity.
There was the vision of a demilitarized, autonomous region
in the West Bank, but adherence to this demilitarization is
improbable.

As Rabin himself once phrased it, "the number

of broken treaties in the Middle East is equal to the number
signed."'-

In addition, there is no way to stop a country

from breaking these kind of demilitarization agreements, if
they are being devious and c o v e r t . D a v i d Bar-Illan has
given an example of this type of covert betrayal in
“ Jillian Becker, The PLO-The Rise and Fall of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1984), 233. The article asks for help from other
progressive forces and declares that the liberation of
Palestine will destroy the Zionist movement.
“David Bar-Illan, "Why a Palestinian State is Still a
Mortal Threat," Commentary November (1993)29.
""Ibid.
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describing what could happen in an independent Palestinian
state :
...Iraq has shown, despite all the sophisticated
monitoring available today, a sovereign country can
accumulate heavy arms undetected. With its own air
ports and seaport, and with free movement across the
Jordanian border, the new Palestinian state could
acquire not only tanks but also fighter planes and
heavy artillery.'*
In addition, if a state becomes sovereign, how would Israel
enforce such standards?

The Palestinians will most likely

ignore any agreements, for three reasons. Aharon Levran
explains these reasons as, "First and foremost, because such
arrangements are by nature restrictive and humiliatinginhibiting independence, freedom of action, and certainly
sovereignty... Second, the likely circumstances in which
their state would be born will certainly stiffen their
positions and affect their willingness to remain restricted
and humiliated...Third, when the discussions on security
arrangements took place it would mean that a Palestinian
state was already fait accompli, and what remained was a
question of price .'“ ~
After all, if Palestine becomes a separate entity and
an independent state, they should be able to have a military
“David Bar-Illan, "Why a Palestinian State is Still a
Mortal Threat," Commentary November (19 93)29.
“Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian
State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)144. His explanations were
written before the Oslo Accords and the official peace
process was started. There were security discussions in the
Accords of which the Palestinians did agree to comply with,
but his premonitions may turn out to be correct.
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force like all other sovereign nations.

In an article

written by Louis Rene' Benes and Zalma Shoval, it is
declared that,

"Because of the right of sovereign states to

maintain military forces essential to self-defense is
certainly such a rule, Palestine could...be entirely within
its right to abrogate any treaty that had compelled its
d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n . A n y kind of military force, very
possibly a combined Arab force, is a threat to Israel
because of Israel's geographic vulnerability in the event of
Palestinian statehood.
Geographical Implications of an Independent Palestinian
State on Israel
Geographically,

Israel is a small country.

The

relinquishment of this additional land will bring Israel
back to its original pre-war 1967 borders.

This proposes

grave dangers for Israel with no hope for anything but grave
consequences.

The territory that Israel returns is vital to

its security and the location vis-a'-vis Israel could bring
unfortunate disaster to Israel if surrounded by hostile
neighbors.
Benjamin Netanyahu asserts that "There can be no
disputing that the protective wall of the West Bank is
crucial for Israel's defense.

But there can also be no

"'Louis Rene Benes and Zalma Shoval ed. by Patrick M .
Cronin, "Why a Demilitarized Palestinian "Entity" Would Not
Remain Demilitarized: The View According to International
Law," Strategic Review Summer (1995)73.
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disputing that a large number of Arabs live on this wall.
If Israel were to relinquish control of the West Bank, it
would create a security n i g h t m a r e . T h i s sheds light on
Netanyahu's current 1998 position on Palestinian autonomy.
In sizing up Israel, after returning the land and a
new Palestinian state eventually emerges, Aharon Levran
explains that:
Israel within the Green Line [pre-'67 lines] is only
14 kilometers wide at the narrow waistline of the
coastal plain, four times smaller than the West
Bank, which is 55 kilometers broad as the crow flies
(Qalqilia to Jordan). Roughly two-thirds of the
population of Israel resides along the coastal strip
from Akko to Ashod, as well as 80 percent of its
industrial plants.“
Levran continues :
The main geo-military implications of this data
indicate the importance of Judea and Samaria to
Israel's security, particularly in terms of the
defense of its most vital territory.
The facts
point out the vulnerability of most of the cities
and population of Israel, which are at the very
mercy of whoever commands the mountain range to the
east. They also indicate that the defensive
capability from the eastern slopes of Judea and
Samaria is far more efficient than that of the
western slopes...Above all, it is patently clear
that Israel lacks the ability to build a plausible
defensive disposition in the flat strip 14-20 kilo
meters wide that is its vital territory.“
Benjamin Netanyahu shares this same line of reasoning.

He

maintains that :
“ Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations
Bantam Books, 19 93)294.

(New York:

"'^Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian
State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)134.
“ Ibid.,135.
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The topography of the Judean and Samarian mountains
is particularly well suited for the delaying actions
necessary for Israel's defense.
To an invader from
the east, this range is an extraordinary obstacle
that must be overcome to reach the Israeli coastline
...The West Bank thus provides Israel not only with
strategic depth but with strategic height.'"
In an article entitled "The West Bank and Military
Technology," Edward Bar illustrates:
The West Bank...was divided into three north-south
trending topographic and strategic zones. The
Eastern Zone, adjacent to the central sector of the
of the Israel-Jordan border, comprises Israel's side
of the Jordan River floodplain and the step like
cliffs that form the rim of the Rift Valley. The
The Central Zone is a narrow strip defined by the
mountainous spine, rising in several locations to
three thousand feet above sea level and providing
ideal sites for early warning radar stations.
The
Western Zone encompasses the Judean and Samarian
foothills that dominate Israel's populated coastal
plain.“
When clarifying his in-depth study of the geographic
importance of the West Bank, Sar concludes the three-fold
zone system has "war deterrent qualities in a static
confrontation... movement -impeding characteristics, natural

“ Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York:
Bantam Books, 1993)263-65. The strategic depth that
Netanyahu describes is the amount of space that Israel has a
buffer zone. He defines strategic depth as "the distance the
enemy has to cover before it can enter Israel's populated
areas, inflict enormous civilian casualties, and conquer its
cities translates into the time that Israel has to mobilize.
The farther the advancing column has to travel, the more
likely it is that air harassment and resistance on the
ground will be able to stem the advance and therefore
purchase time for the mobilization and deployment of
‘’^Edward Sar, "The West Bank and Military Technology, "
Global Affairs Summer/Fall (1990)148.
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obstacles, and vantage points..." that are "vital to the
dynamics of modern war."^°
In discussing the Gaza Strip, Aharon Levran states that
it does not pose the same scale of threat to Israel as the
West Bank, but nevertheless the threat is still there.
Levran explains,

"Because of its geographical proximity no

the Southern settlements and to the center of Israel, and
its location on a principal axis of access from the south to
Israel's vital territory and Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip has
the potential to serve as a forward hostile base...'"^”

The

importance of these lands to Israel's security is
geographically apparent.
Military Implications of an Independent Palestinian State on
Israel
Aside from the obvious geographical security
implications of Palestine becoming an independent state,
there are serious military dangers as well.

Geography

points out the vulnerable position that Israel will be in,
surrounded by land that can provide for an easy attack on
its most vital areas.

The military implications point out

the more serious danger to Israel posed by the surrounding
Arabs.

^Edward Sar, "The West Bank and Military Technology, "
Global Affairs Summer/Fall (1990)148.
^Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian
State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)135.
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Although it would take some time for an independent
Palestinian state to do damage to Israel on its own, it
would never have to act unilaterally, because the
possibility of a unified Arab coalition is promising.

This

kind of coalition, if attempted, could feasibly wipe out an
Israeli force.

In The Military Dangers of a Palestinian

State. Aharon Levran gives a frightening scenario for
Israel:
Two such kinds of coalitions are; an "eastern front"
coalition including the armies of Syria, Jordan,
and expeditionary forces from Iraq and Saudi Arabia
at the least, and a comprehensive Arab coalition
including the Egyptian army as well.
If something like this were to occur, Israeli forces would
be outnumbered.

An eastern front coalition would outnumber

Israel's defense force 4:1, but if Israel had the advantage
of being able to mobilize its reserve forces, the number
changes in Israel's favor to 2:1.’'

In Israel's Quest for

Security, it is written that :
A recent estimate by Israeli Major General Avraham
Rotem suggests that in a future war, 'an Arab
coalition including Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and SaudiArabia-without Egypt, and including a limited
Iraqi force and a symbolic presence of additional
forces-will pit Israel against some against some
7,000 tanks, 1,500 quality armored personnel
carriers, 200 combat helicopters, almost 3,000
artillery guns, 50-60 surface-to-surface missile
Launchers, approximately 1,000 planes...and a total
armed force of between 800,000-900,000 soldiers

^’■Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian
State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)135.
®=Ibid.
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and officers.'"
Of course, the key here is that Israel would have to
have the time and forewarning of an attack to mobilize its
reserves and this is an advantage that most likely will not
be t h e r e . A n independent Palestinian state will not allow
Israel to keep intelligence installations in those vital
areas that it will need to prepare for an attack, for this
would defeat Palestinian purposes.

This kind of surprise

attack would restrict Israeli defensive capability.'’
There is the argument that Israel was able to ward off
a combined attack once before and it will be able to do so
in the future.

The problem with this argument is that it is

not 1967 or 1973 anymore and there have been many evolutions
in the Middle East since then.

Levran states that :

...in 1967 the Israeli Air Force was able to

“Martin Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York:
Praeger Publishing, 1989)188.
a-i

Ibid.,136.

“Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian
State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)137. Levran gives a
scenario of the swiftness of an Arab attack on Israel. He
writes that an Arab coalition could transport forces "in a
swift surprise movement to the Green Line, and from there
attacking the narrow waistline of Israel on the coastal
strip. Such an attack could be supported by advanced
military preparations that the Palestinians would undertake
such as stockpiling light arms and erecting concealed
obstructions and fortifications on the areas. These
obstacles could take shape despite restrictive security
arrangements, through a slow and hidden process." Levran
explains that this kind of an attack could be maneuvered "in
less than twelve hours."
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swiftly knock out the principle Arab forces in an
operation that had a decisive influence on the
course of the war. Repetition of such an operation
is almost not feasible due to the extensive
defensive measures that have been undertaken by the
Arab air forces... Since then, the Arabs have
certainly learned from their mistakes, and the name
of the game is surprise and isolation of the
battlefield, preventing Israeli troops from
redressing the balance of forces. Also in 1967,
Israel... launched the offensive...However, in the
future there is little guarantee that Israel will
be able to be the initiator.“
With these changes in mind, the Arabs have newer
weapons at their disposal, and there is an emphasis on the
proliferation of chemical weapons.

Many Arab countries have

been developing new technology or have supplied technology
by other countries.

Iraq proved that it could be a threat

during the Gulf War with its attack on Israel with a Scud
missile and in an article title Israeli Security in a
Changing World, it is written that "Egypt...has been
developing new surface-to-surface weapons-weapons that
could, especially if there is a violent transfer of power in
Cairo, be used with devastating effect against the Jewish
state.In

addition, Beres asserts that:

Syria continues to be another major threat to
Israel. Late in 1988, Israeli officials expressed
concern that the Soviet Union had concluded a
deal to provide Syria with a Sukhoi 24, one of
Moscow's most sophisticated bomber aircraft.
This plane has the potential to reach strategic
positions in central and southern Israel.
“Aharon Levran, "The Military Dangers of a Palestinian
State," Global Affairs Fall (1989)140.
^^Louis Rene' Benes, "Israel's Security in a Changing
World," Strategic Review Fall (1990)12.
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The Soviets have also supplied to Damascus the
MIG-29, an aircraft with a combat radius of 1,100
nautical miles, high performance look-down shootdown radar, and short-range or over-the-horizon
AA-9 and AA-10 missiles.“
There has also been a wide range of chemical and
biological weapons proliferation among many of the Arab
countries that are hostile towards Israel.

For example:

Iraq began production of chemical weapons in the
early 1960's and now has the capacity to make
1,000 tons annually.
Iraq's use of chemical
weapons in the Gulf War may have killed or in
jured as many as 45,000 Kurds or Iranians.
Egypt began production of chemical weapons in
the early 1960's and used these weapons during
its involvement in North Yemen's civil war in
that period.
Iran began production of chemical arms in response
to Iraqi use, and is believed to have used small
quantities of poison gas by 1987.
Libya obtained poison gas in 1987, apparently
from Iran, and used chemicals against Chad's
military forces in 1987.
Syria first received chemical weapons from Egypt
before the 1973 war, and now manufactures nerve
gas and other chemical weapons, including
warheads .''
Martin Sicker, in his book Israel's Quest for
Security, suggests that there is no need for Israel to feel
comfortable in this new era:
While Israel's security posture today is probably
better than at any time in history, there is
little reason for complacency... The unceasing
flow of sophisticated and increasingly deadly
®®Louis Rene' Benes, "Israel's Security in a Changing
World," Strategic Review Fall (1990)12.
39

Ibid.
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weapons, including ever longer range missiles,
and the frightening readiness of some Middle
Eastern states to engage in chemical warfare,
may easily upset all rational calculations.“
With these changes taking place over the years in the
Arab abilities to wage war efficiently, Israel is under
constant threat.

Giving up land and reducing its size to

relatively nothing only increases the chances of an Arab
coalition victory.
There are numerous threats posed to Israeli security
by other Arab nations.

If Israel is reduced to its pre-1967

borders, it will have more to fear than just a new
Palestinian neighbor.

For example, the small and vulnerable

size of this new Israel will attract the likes of Syria, a
long time enemy of the Jewish state.
The Threat of Syria and the Return of the Golan Heights
In addition to a peace agreement with the Palestinians,
former Prime Minister Rabin entered into negotiations with
Syria.

The negotiations were to center on one issue,

Golan Heights.

the

The Heights were captured by Israel in 1967,

lost, and then recaptured again in the 1973 attack upon
Israel by Syria and friends.
This territory has become a strategic necessity for
Israel because it overlooks vital Israeli territory and was
once a piece of land from which many attacks aimed at Israel

^“Martin Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York;
Praeger Publishing, 1989)188.
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took place.

For example, many farms in Northern Israel have

been shelled from the Golan in the past.'"'
that Israel keep this territory.

It is important

As Ze'ev Begin states,

"The tiny area-400 square kilometers-is of course vital to
Israeli security."“

Aside from the Israeli need to keep

hold of the Golan Heights, the prospect of peace with Syria,
in exchange of anything at all, is extremely questionable.
Syria has never been willing to acknowledge Israel's
existence, much less acknowledge that Israel's occupation of
the Golan Heights as legitimate.

Syria wants that land

back, there is no doubt about that, but it is not just the
Golan that Syria would like to seize.

Syria would like to

have all land included inside Israel's borders and its
surrounding territories of Gaza and the West Bank.

However,

Syria has never been willing to pay the peace price for ic,
as Egypt did and as Yasser Arafat purports to be doing
today.

In fact, Syria's war on Israel has never been solely

about the Golan, or the Palestinian refugees, but rather
Israel's right to claim legitimacy in the Arab world.
Benjamin Netanyahu, the present day Prime Minister of
Israel and Likud Party leader, has always believed the fight

“ Daniel Pipes, "Is Damascus Ready for Peace?" Foreign
Affairs Fall (1991)44.
“ Ze'ev Begin, A Zionist Stand (London: Frank Cass &Co.,
1993)147.
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is not "territorial but e x i s t e n t i a l . N e t a n y a h u discusses
in his 1993 book, A Place Among Nations, that while
attending the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, the subject
matter kept turning away from peace and always back to
question of Israel's right to exist.

He remembers sadly the

Syrian Foreign Minister at the Peace Conference,
continuously questioning Israel's right to exist as a
nation, and ignoring what were to be the primary objectives
of the Conference: water resources, controls over certain
lands, and other pertinent issues.“

Netanyahu quotes the

Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas as once saying "The
conflict between the Arab nation and Zionism is over
existence, not borders .
Nevertheless, Syria has continued the fight to take
back the Golan Heights.

It has charged that Israel has

illegally occupied the lands by referring to a preamble in
the UN Security Council document that claims that lands
conquered in war are not recognized as belonging to the
aggressor.“

However, in this instance, Israel was not the

“ Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York:
Bantam Books, 1993)329.
94

Ibid.,330.

“ Ibid. This quote wa.^ given one year prior to the Madrid
Peace Conference. It was footnoted by Netanyahu. It was
obtained by Damascus Television Service, March 7, 1990.
“ Samuel Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in
Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York:
Steimatzsky/Shapolsky, 1985)188. The Security Council
preamble talks specifically about "the inadmissability of
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aggressor and the U.N. never branded Israel as an aggressor
state.

Israel preempted an attack on the Arab countries

that were planning to attack it, so taking the lands was in
self-defense.

Netanyahu states that "Israel has at no point

set out to conquer anything.

It has been repeatedly forced

into wars of self-defense against Arab regimes ideologically
committed to its d e s t r u c t i o n . H e goes on to write that
the territory of the Golan Heights was continually used as a
strongpoint for Arab terrorist attacks before and after the
1967 war.“
Strategically,

the relinquishment of the Golan Heights

will jeopardize Israeli security.

The strategic depth of

Northern Israel, called the "the buffer zone", that allows
Israel time to mobilize forces in an emergency, is nowhere
to be found in these new agreements.'"'

Martin Sicker

differentiates between the relinquishment of the Sinai to
Egypt, which still provided Israel with strategic depth in
the Negev that separated Israel from the Egyptian frontier,
and relinquishing the Golan Heights to Syria, which is the
strategic depth Israel needs to protect itself, because

the acquisition of territory by war...," meaning war by
aggressors, not self-defense.
“ Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York:
Bantam Books, 1993)140.
“ Ibid.
“Martin Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1989)186-87.
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Northern Israel does not have that c a p a c i t y . S i c k e r goes
on to write that "the Golan is much too close to the
population centers of Northern Israel for the latter to
seriously consider trading it for a peace agreement as
generally envisioned by the territory for peace formula.
With this reality, what could have possibly been the basis
for Rabin and Shimon Peres for considering returning the
Golan?

As Sicker notes,

"the question to be answered is

whether a Syrian signature on a piece of paper is worth
turning over a piece of strategic real estate that Israel
paid dearly in blood in 1967 and which was critical in
preventing the destruction of a large part of Northern
Israel in 1973 ... Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights is
in itself a deterrent to a unilateral Syrian militaryinitiative ."
More importantly, Syria's signature on a peace treaty
could hardly be maintained as legitimate.

This is not only

because Syria does not recognize Israel, but because Syria
has always maintained that it will only enter into a state
of nonbelligerency with Israel.

This is not peace.

The

concept of "state of nonbelligerency" is questionable, with
'“ Martin Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1989)186-87.
“ "Ibid.
"°^Ibid. Sicker notes that Israel's occupation of the
Golan Heights also gives Israel the room to defend itself by
being able to conduct major ground assaults on Damascus if
attacked by Syria.
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regards to Syria.

Syria has a long history of signing

agreements and shirking their responsibilities.

David Bar-

Illan cites some examples of these agreements:
In 1983, he [Assad] broke a pledge he had made to
the Reagan Administration that he would accept the
Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty and withdraw his
troops from Lebanon. He did the opposite: as soon
as Israel began to get out, he poured more troops
into Lebanon.
Assad is also in violation of the Saudi-sponsored
Taif agreement, endorsed by all the Arab states,
which stipulates the withdrawal of Syrian troops
and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.
This September [1993] marks precisely a year since
Syrian troops were supposed to have left Beirut.
If Syria was so willing to abrogate it's agreements in the
Arab arena, it is not likely that Syria will ever abide by
an agreement with Israel.
There are other pertinent factors to examine, when
investigating Syria's past relative to its future with
Israel.

For example, the PLO received financial backing

from Syria to help train the Iranian terrorist organization
Hezbollah, a group that has continuously aimed terrorist
activities at I s r a e l . T h e PLO has been on a quest to
annihilate Israel, and Syria helped them.

"“ David Bar-Illan,
September (1993)29.

Syria has enjoyed

"Israel's New Pollyanna's," Commentary

"“ David Bar-Illan, "If This Be Peace...," Commentary
February (1995)29. Bar-Illan notes that Hezbollah could not
have conducted any successful attacks on Israel if it ere
not for Syria because Syria equips them with weapons and
trains their fighters on its territory.
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waging "proxy war on Israel through H e z b o l l a h . T h e r e

is

also the issue of Syria trying to achieve military "parity"
with Israel.

Syria currently spends 50-60 percent of its

government budget on the military and 30 percent of its GNP
on military e x p e n s e s . T h i s behavior is indicative of
preparation,

so Syria's quest for true peace should always

be thoroughly questioned and examined before really
believing that it is feasible.
Along with these dilemmas, there is the historical
issue of inter-Arab conflict that make a lasting peace
impossible for the future of the Middle East.
just pertaining to Israel.

This is not

Inter-Arab conflict is

insolvable as well.

"“David Bar-Illan, "If This Be Peace...," Commentary
February (1995)29.
"“ Daniel Pipes, "Is Damascus Ready for Peace?" Foreign
Affairs Fall (1991)47.
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CHAPTER

4

INTER-ARAB DIFFICULTY
The Inter-Arab Question
"For half a century, Arab governments have hidden behind the
Arab-Israeli conflict""''
The Arab-Israeli conflict is not the only matter
plaguing the Middle East, nor has it ever been.

In fact,

it

could be noted that the majority of the conflict in the
Middle East is due to inter-Arab conflicts and not the
Israelis.

Far more people have been killed in inter-Arab,

inter-Islam wars, and by Arab leaders of their own people,
than in the Arab-Israeli wars.

This was just an additional

problem and a clever way to mask the harsher realities.'
It could be said that the problems with Israel are not
really secondary but intertwined tightly.

In any case.

"^"Augustus Richard Norton and Robin Wright, "The Post
Peace Crises in the Middle East," Survival Vol.36, No.4
(Winter 1994-5)7.
"“Dr. Joseph Churba, "The Middle East," Defense and
Strategic Studies, Southwest Missouri State University,
October 25, 1995. Dr. Churba specified in this lecture that
Israel is the number one subscriber to the idea that they
are the center of the conflict, but the center of the
conflict has always been "who has the right to rule with
legitimacy in the Middle East?"
55
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inter-Arab tensions including basic tyranny, fighting over
legitimacy, and a fear of an independent Palestinian state
are just as crucial to peace in the Middle East.
For many years, the world has believed the myth that
the core of the Middle Eastern problem was Israel.

Benjamin

Netanyahu believed that the advent of the Gulf War finally
helped to change minds about this prospect. An Arab country
had invaded another Arab country and it opened the eyes of
many nations to the realities of the Middle East.""'"
However, it was not as if the reality had not been that
way for many years prior,

it was just not exposed.

There

are scores of wars and cruelty that have taken place in the
Middle East among a supposed united Arab coalition.
Netanyahu states that since the beginning of Arab statehood,
that "virtually every one of them had been involved in wars,
attempts at subversion and assassination, and unending
intrigue against one or more of its Arab neighbors-and
against its non-Arab neighbors.""""
Iran and Iraq, until before the Gulf War had been at
war for up to nine long years,

"a devastating conflict that

claimed well over a million lives and demolished vast

"‘
"^Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations (New York:
Bantam Books, 1993)92.
110

Ibid.,93.
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sections of both countries."'*""

Other examples are available

pertaining to this :
Libya has clashed with Tunisia and bombed Sudan
...Libya has financed numerous efforts to topple
other Arab regimes or assassinate their leaders
...Egypt, under Nasser, tries to assassinate
the leaders of Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq...
Egypt attempted to impose its regime on Syria
...and began brutal occupation of the nation of
Yemen...
When they have not been fighting with each other,
both Yemens have lived in constant fear of Saudi
Arabia...
Iraq...carried out an energetic campaign of sub
version and terrorism against a number of Arab
states, including its traditional enemy Syria,
and its recent friend Jordan...
Syria...has repeatedly threatened Jordan, murdered
its diplomats, set off bombs in Amman, and even
invaded Jordanian territory..."""
With these examples of Arab inter-fighting, it is an odd
thing that Israel would have thought it could live in peace,
simply because they gave land back.
The truth is that many Arab nations use the
Palestinian problem as a justification for trying to gain
what they want.

For example,

"The Palestinians have often

been used on the inter-Arab scene as the spearhead against
countries suspected of lack of real commitment to qawmiyya,
Arab nationalism.

They have also been used to weaken the

position of leading Arab countries, by presenting them as
weak in their commitment to Palestinians and to the Arab

"""Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among Nations
Bantam Books, 19 93)93.

(New York:

"""Ibid.93-95 .
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cause as a whole.""""

The Palestinians have been used to

make certain Arab countries look important and be recognized
in the Arab world and the rest of the world, as in the case
of Syria or Iraq.""""

When Saddam Hussein attacked Israel

with a Scud missile during the Gulf War and demanded its
relinquishing of the occupied territories, it had verylittle to do with the invasion of Kuwait.
secondary issue.

It was a

In fact, history shows that the Arabs

cared very little about the Palestinian cause.
The controversial issue of the Palestinian refugees
has been a constant source of debate among the Arab
negotiators.

Yet, the Arabs did very little for the

refugees themselves when they left Israel at the Arab
behest.""'

The Arabs used the refugee problem as a means of

gaining monetary help, getting the world involved in the
cause, and vilifying Israel.

However, it is seldom

remembered that there were more Jewish refugees from Arab
states, than Arab refugees from Israel, and they have long
been absorbed by Israel.
What if Israel, theoretically, will not pose a barrier
to the independent state of Palestine, what will these Arab

"""Gabriel Ben Gurion, The Palestinians and the Middle
East Conflict (Tel Aviv : Turtledove Publishing, 1979)157
114

Ibid.

"“ Sameul Katz, Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in
Palestine (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, New York:
Steimatzsky/Shapolsky, 1985)21.
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nations do?

Chances are great that their countries will be

full of conflict and strife because now their own regimes
will be the focus.""®

It is likely that the civilians in

these Arab countries will demand change and these "demands
for change are a function of half a century or more of
corruption, repression, and the arbitrary exercise of
power. """^

Arab regimes have been able to cultivate and

maintain this power, in part, due to the problems with
Israel, but now the technicalities of Israeli occupation is
over and Israel has recognized Palestinian autonomy.

This

leaves their cause lingering, with the exception of the
fight to rule Palestine.
The Fight to Rule Palestine
There have been a number of countries in the past and
present that will fight to rule over Palestine.

There may

be a new Arab state on the West Bank with specific claims
and the will to fight for rule over all of Palestine.

Syria

has always maintained that the autonomous regions are a part
of "Greater Syria" while Arafat claims that Syria is a part
of Palestine, as well as the past fight between King Hussein
of Jordan, who claims Palestine to be a part of Jordan,

Augustus Richard Norton and Robin Wright, "The Post
Peace Crises in the Middle East," Survival Vol.36, No.4
(Winter, 1994-5)8.
""'Ibid.
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while Arafat believes Jordan to be a part Palestine, both
being essentially true.""®
In an article "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine", Daniel
Pipes argues that there are four groups that have been and
will be, arguing over the outcome of Palestine.

These

include Palestinian separatists, Arab nationalists, the
Jordanian government, of which might be ignored considering
Hussein has since let go of the idea of Jordan's ownership
of Palestine, and the Syrian government.
The PLO is now what Pipes referred to as Palestinian
separatists.

They assert their right to rule Palestine, but

really they have just been puppets of other Arab
governments.
severely,

In addition to this, the PLO is fragmented

"made up of almost a dozen fractious groupings

advocating contrary programs.

One Palestinian group is pro-

Syrian, another pro-Iraqi, and so forth.

They disagree on

ideology and on personnel, who should lead the Nashashibi or
Husayni family, al-Fatah or the PLFP, As-Sa'iga or Abu
Nidal, the West Bank notables or yet others?"""" and there
will be an internal struggle over the issue of Palestine.

"“ Daniel Pipes, "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine,"
Commentary July (1987)17. This article was written in 1987,
Jordan has since cut his ties of ownership to Palestine, but
Arafat has not given up the belief about Jordan, thus
proving a danger to Jordan of an independent state of
Palestine.
""®Ibid.
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As it is now, many Palestinians are upset over the way
Arafat is conducting affairs.

It has been noted that there

is a significant amount of people that do not even see
Arafat as the legitimate leader of the Palestinian people,
but unfortunately, this has not weakened his position.
Arafat has now what is called a "police state," tyrannical
and repressive.

It is probable that this will make the

Palestinian people to beg the Israelis to return to the
territories.
Arafat has not changed the territories into a
possible legitimate state, not yet.

In fact, Arafat has

done relatively nothing in the way of electoral politics-'
but has managed to maintain the PLO as a "loosely
constructed terrorist-guerilla-propaganda structure whose
cohesiveness is based on loyalty to the man at the top.""""
It is debatable how far the loyalty to Arafat will travel.
Many people regard him as a traitor for signing the Oslo
Accords, many have just accepted it, and many applaud him
for what he is accomplishing, but there is a small group of
young Palestinians who regard Arafat as a foreigner.

To

make issues more complicated, within the divisions in the
PLO, there is an unorganized youth coalition that could

"^°Amos Perlmutter, "Arafat's Police State," Foreign
Affairs July/August (19 94)9.
“ "Ibid.
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present a c h a l l e n g e . O n e other point worth mentioning
regarding the PLO is the issue of Arafat's harsh and
tyrannical treatment of his own people.

This is bound to

pose serious problems internally over who should rule
Palestine.
The second group that Pipes points out, are the Arab
nationalists.

This group consists of a large Arab coalition

that believes that Palestine should not become an
independent entity, but should integrate itself into a
larger Arab e n t i t y . T h e Arab nationalists would like to
unite into one Arab state "that will eventually comprise all
Arabic speakers between the Atlantic ocean and the Persian
Gulf, from Morocco to Oman, of which Palestine will be a
small province.
The third contender in the fight to control Palestine
is Syria.

Syria has always alleged that Palestine is a part

of Southern Syria and that Palestine was taken from Syria to
"""Amos Perlmutter, "Arafat's Police State," Foreign
Affairs July/August {1994)10.
"""Nadav Haetzni, "Misery and Terror Reign in Jericho, "
The Yesha Report, May 1995.The article deals with specific
instances of the Arafat government's treatment of its
citizens, if they called that as of yet. These entail
illegally imprisoning them for suspected Israeli
commiserating and acts of severe torture, sometimes
resulting in death.
""‘Daniel Pipes, "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine,"
Commentary July/August (1987)19.
""^Ibid. This group would include the former Nasser of
Egypt, Colonel Quaddafi of Libya, and in some cases Iraq and
Saudi Arabia.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

63

create Israel.""®

In fact, Syria would probably try to fight

the creation of an independent Palestinian state on this
basis, unless of course, if it would be a Syrian-puppet
government.""'

It is possible that if Palestine did become

an independent state, and it will if Netanyahu is not better
supported, Syria will try to topple the existing regime,
assuming it might not be Arafat in the future, and gain
control of it by "proxy wars."""®

Syria poses the biggest

threat here because it is more militarily capable than the
former contenders.

The idea of Syrian imperialism poses not

just a threat to Israeli people and a Palestinian state, but
to Jordan as well, since Jordan was a part of Palestine
before the British Mandate.
Daniel Pipes mentions additional players in the
competition over Palestine.

These players include the

Muslim fundamentalists, who identify Palestine as a
"historic part of Muslim patrimony."

The Saudi Arabian

""®Daniel Pipes, "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine,"
Commentary July/August (1987 ,21. See also Commentary,
December 1986, in an article entitled "Palestine for the
Syrians" there is a quote by Assad, saying "There is no
Palestinian people, there is no Palestinian entity, there is
only Syria!...It is we, the Syrian authorities, who are the
real representatives of the Palestinian people." Pipes has
another example from Damascus radio from June 198 0 that says
"Syria views Palestine-according to historic, cultural, and
geographic factors-as its own southern province."
""'Michael Widlanski, ed. , Can Israel Survive a
Palestinian State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced
Strategic and Political Studies, 1990)81.
""®Ibid.
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government has been a long time supporter of this Islamic
claim to Palestine and the Iranian government also claims
Islamic ties to Palestine."""
There is going to be conflict in the Middle East long
after the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved, if it ever
really is.

There is far too much history of internal strife

within Arab countries and communities, before and during the
Israeli issue.
prove this.

There are many wars to look back upon to

The fight for power and leadership of the Arab

world will continue and the domestic problems within each
country will be emphasized without the Israeli shield to
hide behind.

Most importantly, the fight for leadership in

the future states of Palestine will be a great source of
tension and possible disaster
Jordan and Fears of a Palestinian State
"At stake for Hussein is the economic and political future
of his Kingdom"
Jordan does support the creation of a third
Palestinian state because it does not want to alienate
itself from the rest of the Arab community.

However, Jordan

has almost as much to fear as Israel when it pertains to
Palestinian statehood.

Jordan is weak economically and

"""Daniel Pipes, "Arab vs. Arab Over Palestine,"
Commentary July/August (1987)22.
""“Lawrence Tal, "Is Jordan Doomed?" Foreign Affairs
Vol.72, No. 5 (November/December 1993)52.
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physically and stands to lose everything if Palestine
becomes independent.
There are a few major reasons why Jordan faces grave
dangers at the creation of a Palestinian state.

One, is

that Yasser Arafat and most other Palestinian officials
regard Jordan as Eastern Palestine, an integral part of the
Palestinian state.

In Can Israel Survive a Palestinian

State?. it is written that "Arafat wants to use Jordan
before he throttles Hashemite rule.

The PLO Chairman has

been willing to deal with King Hussein on a variety of joint
ventures ... in order to gain a power base which would be
strengthened later at Hussein's e x p e n s e T h i s

comes as

no surprise, considering Hussein and Arafat have never been
on stable terms.

Aside from this, there are specific

reasons why Jordan is viewed as the "other half" of
Palestine :
First, there is a geographical bond and a
historical connection between the two banks: the
West Bank or Trans-Jordan. Secondly, there is a
large Palestinian Arab population in the Kingdom
of Jordan.
There are independent estimates of
over 65% Palestinian population throughout Jordan
and as much as an 80% Palestinian predomination of
key Jordanian cities."""

"""Michael Widlanski, ed. Can Israel Survive a Palestinian
State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and
Political Studies, 1990)78-80.
"""Ibid.
"""Ibid.
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This leads to the second grave danger facing Jordan.
Because Jordan holds so many Palestinian people that makes
very likely that they will want to join with the West Bank
themselves, either out of loyalty or pressures.

This could

provide for future internal conflict for the Jordanian
citizens that are not Palestinians."’"'
Economically, Jordan is a weak country.

It has

constantly relied upon the support of outside lenders for
its livelihood, such as the United States.

Hussein has a

legitimate fear that such aid will eventually be given over
to new Palestinian regions.

The United States has already

committed to aiding the Palestinians.

This will cripple

Jordan, because "Jordan's per capita income is lower than
that of either the West Bank or Gaza, the unemployment rate
is 25% and more than 3 0% of the population lives below the
poverty line."""®
There was the possibility of a joint confederation
between Jordan and the PLO.

However, even though once upon

a time this would have been in Jordan's favor, the present
situation is not so kind.

The PLO is more powerful than

before and Jordan is weaker.""®

The two entities have had

"""‘Michael Widlanski,e d . Can Israel Survive a Palestinian
State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and
Political Studies,1990)78.
""^Lawrence Tal, "Is Jordan Doomed?" Foreign Affairs
"Vol. 72, No .5 (November/December, 1993)52.
"“ Ibid.
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nothing lasting in the ways of agreements before and it is
likely that will not change.

In Can Israel Survive a

Palestinian State?. it is asserted that "The confederation
would soon dissolve.

It would leave an independent

Palestinian West-Bank/Gaza state or an even greater menace :
a Palestinian state that had swallowed up Jordan."""'
Jordan might find itself in a difficult position in
the future, when Palestine becomes its own state.

There is

the possibility of the new Palestinian leadership trying co
swallow Jordan.

There is also the potential that the

Palestinians in Jordan will want to reunite with the West
Bank and this will create internal strife.
Palestine could become stronger than Jordan.

Economically,
Since a

confederation of the two entities would fail, Jordan has to
sit back and watch like the rest of the world at the
eventual outcome of a Palestinian state.

""'Michael Widlanski, ed. Can Israel Survive a Palestinian
State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced and Political
Studies, 1990)80.
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CHAPTER

5

CONCLUSION
I.
Land for peace is an old idea for Israel.

It is one

that has never provided them with the conclusions that they
had anticipated and hoped for.

Early evidence of the

outcome of Resolution 242 and 338 points out these
agreements as failures, as well as later evidence of the
Camp David Accords, and the almost immediate and current
failures of the Oslo Accords.
With respect to Resolutions 242 and 338, these were
generally rejected by every Arab country.

The impossibility

of the Arabs to understand that Israel did not have to
relinquish all territory confiscated in self defense, unless
borders were recognized and a "just and lasting peace" could
prevail, made the prospects of peace totally unthinkable.
With respect to Camp David, there is something to be
commended for an Arab country to actually engage in a peace
treaty with Israel, especially at the expense of itself.

It

is often implied that Egypt sacrificed its place in the Arab
community by signing a treaty with Israel.

However, Egypt

was eventually allowed to resume relations with other Arab
68
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countries and Israel has rarely to see the desired results
of the Accord.

Egypt has not itself, engaged in attacks on

Israel, but it has continually aided and abetted countries
and organizations that have engaged in terrorist activities
against Israel.

For example, Egypt has provided safe havens

for PLO members.

Egypt violated the agreement by putting

troops in the Sinai when it agreed not to, yet Egypt has
retained the land that Israel has given back to them in that
same treaty.

Egypt basically signed a mere "treaty of

nonbelligerence."

This was not the idea behind Camp David,

but this is what Israel got.
Oslo, has been violated by Arafat a number of times.
The promise to halt terrorism and denounce it has not yet
materialized, and yet the PLO has already implemented its
power in the

regions that Israel conceded.

The PLO Covenant

was supposed

to have been changed years ago

and only

recently has

it been modified, although there is no real

proof of that.

This Covenant calls for the

complete

destruction of Israel and it is still in existence at a time
when there is constant Palestinian pressure on Israel to
stop settlements and get out.

Just to revert back to the

day of the Oslo signing for a brief moment, Arafat pledged
to his Arab audiences that this whole plan was just a phase
in a number of phases to eliminate Israel, it should now be
clear that peace will not come.

It is written in the
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Jerusalem Post Editorial that "Pledges to destroy
Israel...are hardly indicative of peace.""'*
Golda Meir once stated that "The repeated failure of
international arrangements to safeguard our country's vital
interests has taught us a lesson we do not easily forget.
International decisions proved meaningless in each crises
that we faced...Hence, we inevitably reflect on this history
when urged to take action which could result in diminishing
our capacity for self-defense and make us dependent on
international guarantees.""'

Israel should be reflecting

back in the same way as their once great Prime Minister did
and realize that peace will never likely surface.
II
Israel should reconsider giving anything more back to
Arafat for security reasons.

Arabs have been opposed to

Israeli existence from its birth and none of this is going
to disappear.

Virtually all Arab countries have expressed

the desire to see Israel "thrown into the sea."
than just a desire for Arab hegemony.

It is more

It is an underlying,

and sometimes outright, anti-Semitism that drives them.
Ideology does not change over a span of a few years and if
it is really believed that this anti--Semitic sentiment will

138

^Jerusalem Post Editorial, "Solid Paper Facts,"
Jerusalem Post International September 29, 1995, Friday ed
-^^Golda Meir, "Israel in Search of Lasting Peace,"
Foreign Affairs April (1973)454.
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subside by giving back territory, then this would appear to
be naive.
Geographically,

Israel is a small and vulnerable

country. Israel will eventually have to "pack up and Leave"
if it relinquishes any more territory.

The territory it has

already given back has not been reciprocated with peace.
There should be no more movement on Israel's behalf.

If so,

it is viable that Israel will be defenseless in an attack,
if it did occur.

These boundaries leave Israel without the

necessary strategic depth that it would need to deploy and
mobilize.

An independent state of Palestine, as is hoped by

Arafat, does not have to stay demobilized.

As an

independent state, it will have the same right to have a
defense capability as any other independent state.
point, what will Israel really be able to do?

At that

Israel cannot

tell them no, it might have to reconsider this all together.
Even though a Palestinian state could not do too much
damage on its own, it will not have to.

It will have twenty

other Arab states that may oblige them.

The argument that

Israel was able to defend itself from those borders once
before and it can do it again, may not prove true anymore.
Arab nations have become more militarily advanced and the
weapons they hold now are much more potent and damaging than
in 1967.
Syria poses a threat in such confining borders.
Syria, aside from the Palestinian Arabs, probably holds the
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highest level of hatred.

It would not be totally surprising

if Syria tried to take advantage of the Israeli size,
especially with its semi-modern military capabilities.

The

Golan Heights is helpful to Syria, to be able to wage an
attack on Israel because it could destroy Northern Israel
from this point.

Yet, Israel was, at one point, willing to

give the Golan back, and this would have been a mistake.
Ill
Finally, Israel is not the center of the Middle East
crises.

It obviously plays a big role in the conflict, but

not the number one role.

Oslo will not bring peace to the

region if other conflicts are not resolved beforehand.
There is evidence of instability in these regions aside from
Israel's existence.

History shows that inter-Arab wars were

taking place over a dozen issues, none of them were Israel
in particular.

The results of these inter-Arab conflicts

were in the form of attempted regime overthrows and
assassination attempts.

In fact, half of the Arab states do

not even agree on what should happen to the areas in
question, those being West Bank and Gaza.
Many Arab states fight amongst themselves over who
will be the best equipped nation to rule an independent
Palestinian state and some Arab nations, such as Syria,
vehemently oppose an independent state at all.
the PLO vie for leadership.

Factions of

Furthermore, some Arab states

have more to lose than to gain from this independence,
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Jordan.

This security dilemma imposed on Jordan is both

physical and economical.

These issues would need to be

addressed and solved if peace were ever foreseeable.
IV
The answer to Israel's dilemma is not really one that
can be answered easily.

If Israel does not relinquish land

and rule to the Palestinians, terrorism and violence will
not cease.

If Israel does give back more land, if Netanyahu

decides to cave to pressure, then not only does terrorism
not cease, but it will be more at risk within such tiny
borders.

Once Israel gives up that land and an independent

state emerges, there will be nothing short of war that
Israel can do to reverse the process.

Neither option sounds

inviting, but at least by not releasing more land, Israel
has a better chance of defending itself in the future.
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